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# Known Issues — PumpFun Launch-to-Graduation Corpus
This document is the authoritative, complete record of every data-quality
issue found in this corpus, how it was confirmed, its exact scale, and how
to handle it. Every number below was independently verified by direct
querying against the real data — nothing here is assumed or inherited
without a check.
**Read this before running any analysis.** Several items below are not
optional to handle correctly — skipping them will produce silently wrong
results, not an error.
---
## 1. Fixed issues (already corrected in `tokens.parquet`)
### 1.1 Mayhem-mode 2B-supply concentration bug
Mayhem Mode tokens mint 2,000,000,000 tokens, double the standard
1,000,000,000 — but concentration percentages (`initial_top1/5/10_pct`,
`dev_buy_pct`) were originally computed against a hardcoded 1B-supply
assumption for *every* token, mayhem or not. Proof of the bug: pre-fix,
`initial_top10_pct` reached values up to 200% for mayhem tokens — a
mathematically impossible percentage.
- **Scale:** 109,561 tokens (~12.7% of the corpus)
- **Fix applied:** `*_corrected` columns (`initial_top1_pct_corrected`,
`initial_top5_pct_corrected`, `initial_top10_pct_corrected`,
`dev_buy_pct_corrected`, `supply_bug_corrected`) — **use these, not the
originals**, for any concentration analysis.
---
## 2. Unfixable, excluded issues
### 2.1 Bonding-curve-balance leak
A separate, smaller set of tokens show impossible concentration values
(median `top1_pct` 98.8%, up to 129.3% at top10) caused by a check meant to
exclude the bonding curve's own token balance from the "largest holder"
calculation failing to fire. Confirmed via correlation: `top1_pct`
correlates 0.71 with curve balance at first trade for affected tokens, vs.
-0.02 for unaffected tokens.
- **Scale:** 1,486 tokens, concentrated in a Jun 23-24 window tied to a
burst of clone/factory-launch creator activity
- **Handling:** No correct value can be recovered — these rows are
**flagged via `top10_pct_suspect`, and should be excluded**, not
corrected or imputed.
---
## 3. Trade-level data issues (`trades.parquet`)
### 3.1 `sol_amount` internally inconsistent with `token_amount x price_sol`
For a genuine subset of trade rows, `sol_amount` does not match
`token_amount x price_sol` — in the worst cases, off by up to ~39,000,000x.
Root cause not fully diagnosed (a units/decimals mismatch somewhere in
ingestion is a plausible candidate, not confirmed).
- **Scale:** 1,136,321 rows (3.38% of 33,581,765)
- **Detection:** flag any row where
`sol_amount / (token_amount * price_sol)` falls outside `[0.01, 100]`
- **Handling:** exclude from any SOL-denominated computation (volume, P&L,
leaderboards). This filter is large enough to fully distort a naive
top-wallet ranking if skipped — confirmed during this project's own
research.
### 3.2 `sol_amount` / `price_sol` NULL (missing, not corrupted — distinct issue)
Separately from §3.1, a real share of trades have `sol_amount` and
`price_sol` as NULL rather than wrong — the price was simply never
captured for that trade.
- **Scale:** 2,360,061 rows (7.03%)
- **Pattern, confirmed via direct investigation:**
- Heavily front-loaded in time — the corpus's first ~10 days carry a
disproportionate share, **peaking at 33.6%/45.3% null on Jun 9-10**
(the same 2-day window as the holder-count break, §5.1 — an
interesting coincidence, not proven to share a root cause).
- **Not** tied to trade direction (buy 7.3% vs. sell 6.7% — similar) or
to a specific ingestion source.
- **A whole-token phenomenon, not scattered per-trade gaps**: of ~20,300
affected mints, over 99.8% are tokens where *every* trade is
null-price, not a handful of trades within an otherwise-fine token.
- Skews toward very early trades in a token's life (median ~20 min
post-launch among null rows, vs. ~2.4h corpus-wide).
- **Handling:** flagged via `sol_price_missing` — kept deliberately separate
from `sol_amount_suspect` (§3.1) so the two issues are never conflated.
### 3.3 Non-human wallet contamination
The address `BwWK17cbHxwWBKZkUYvzxLcNQ1YVyaFezduWbtm2de6s` is the Solana
System Program, confirmed via block explorer (Owner: System Program,
isOnCurve: FALSE) — not a market participant.
- **Scale:** 6,690,901 trade rows (19.92% of all trades), touching ~35% of
all mints in the corpus
- **Handling:** **exclude this address from any wallet-derived feature** —
unique wallet counts, wallet concentration, P&L leaderboards, wash
-trading signals. Left in, it silently inflates unique-wallet counts by
one and contaminates every wallet-concentration metric on a third of the
corpus.
### 3.4 `curve_pct_depleted` / `curve_pct_depleted_eob` values outside [0,100]%
Both the per-trade (`trades.curve_pct_depleted`) and end-of-bucket
(`snapshots.curve_pct_depleted_eob`) versions of this field show values
outside the theoretically valid [0,100]% range.
- **Scale:** 1,215,810 trade rows (3.62%), 730,670 snapshot rows (2.71%)
- **Magnitude, confirmed via direct distribution check:** all bad values
are capped at **exactly 110.0**, with 99.95%+ of them barely over the
100% boundary (in the 100-200 bucket, essentially none above 200) — this
looks like a bounded, designed overshoot mechanism, not open-ended
corruption.
- **Mayhem-mode correlation:** real but weak (5.33% bad for mayhem tokens
vs. 3.26% non-mayhem, ~1.6x) — too weak to be the primary mechanism; the
known supply bug (§1.1) produces a much starker gap when it's the actual
cause, confirmed via a synthetic test during this project's own research.
- **Temporal pattern (the dominant signal):** flat and low (0.02%-1.7%)
for the entire corpus from Jun 5 through Jul 2, then **jumps sharply to
8-11% starting Jul 4 and holds through the corpus end (Jul 14)**.
- **Jul 3 is a confirmed one-day gap** — zero recorded trades that day,
due to a websocket collection outage. This explains the missing day
itself. It does **not**, by itself, fully explain why the badness rate
shifted upward and stayed elevated for the ten days following recovery —
whether that reflects a config/version change made during outage
recovery, a platform-side change coinciding with the same window, or
something else has not been further diagnosed.
- **Handling:** treat as a fifth, distinct regime break (§5.5). Any model
or analysis using curve-derived features (`curve_velocity`,
`curve_accel`, `curve_pct_depleted_at_horizon`) should account for this
shift, especially for the final third of the collection window.
---
## 4. `wallet_stats.parquet` reliability — read this before using this table at all
This table's own activity/volume columns cannot be trusted without
independent verification.
- **Systematic cross-check** (100,000 sampled wallets against a live
recount from `trades.parquet`): only **37.7% exact match** on
`total_trades` (59.7% exact match on `tokens_traded`). Mean ratio of
(real / reported) trades = **15.9x**, median = **2x**, max = **16,055x**.
- **Root cause, confirmed via a targeted diagnostic distinguishing three
competing hypotheses:** a **stale snapshot**, not a truncated
aggregation window or a random sampling bug. The discrepancy ratio
climbs monotonically from ~3.3x (wallets whose last real trade fell in
the corpus's first week) to ~46.2x (wallets whose last real trade fell
in the final week) — the exact signature of a table built once, early or
mid-collection, and never regenerated.
- **What is affected:** `tokens_traded`, `total_trades`,
`total_buy_volume_sol`, `total_sell_volume_sol`. **Do not use these four
columns for any activity-volume analysis** — recompute directly from
`trades.parquet` instead (see `quickstart.py` for the pattern).
- **What is not (confirmed) affected:** `first_seen_at`/`last_seen_at`
timestamps were not part of the cross-check that found this issue — they
may still be usable, though they were not independently verified either.
Treat with appropriate caution, not blind trust .
---
## 4.5. outcome_label has no 'rug' value — using it as one will silently
return zero rows. Real values: dead, pump_dump, slow_bleed,
major_pump, minor_pump, sustained. quickstart.py's Section 5
(Gini-vs-rug metric) filters on outcome_label = 'rug' and is currently
broken as a result. Use rug_detected (boolean, in postgard_outcomes.parquet)
for a direct rug flag, or group dead/pump_dump/slow_bleed as "failed"
outcomes if you want the broader category. Fix pending.
## 4.55. migrations.parquet.pool_address contains synthetic sentinel values,
not real pool addresses, for ~25% of rows. synthetic_graduation_queue
(1,380 rows) marks graduations queued but not yet matched to a real pool;
backfilled_from_pumpswap_trade (69 rows) marks pool addresses
reconstructed after the fact from PumpSwap trade data rather than observed
directly at migration time. Filter these out if you need a real on-chain
pool address, or check pool_address NOT IN ('synthetic_graduation_queue',
'backfilled_from_pumpswap_trade') before joining downstream.
**Items 4.5 and 4.55 reported by M. Huzaifa (July 2026) — thank you.**
## 5. Regime breaks / non-stationarity
Five separate, independently-confirmed step-changes exist within the same
39-day corpus. Any cross-corpus time comparison, or any train/test split
whose boundary straddles one of these dates, should account for it.
### 5.1 Jun 9-10: `initial_holder_count` hard-cap change
Maximum value changed from exactly 54 to exactly 20 across a 2-day
transition, and never reverted. `initial_top1/5/10_pct` move in lockstep,
almost certainly because holder count is the denominator context for those
percentiles. Ruled out as a collection outage — hourly trade volume across
Jun 5-20 shows no gap at this boundary. Working hypothesis, not
independently confirmed: Solana's `getTokenLargestAccounts` RPC method is
natively capped at 20 accounts by protocol design, and this date marks a
change in (or loss of a workaround for) that native limit. **Left unfixed
in the data** — this is a real, permanent feature of the corpus, not
something to patch.
### 5.2 Jun 20-22: Mayhem Mode rollout
A new token type (2B supply, see §1.1) did not exist before this date and
ramped to ~28-30% of new launches within three weeks. A real product
change, not a bug — but means token-type composition is not stationary
across the collection window.
### 5.3 Jun 23-24: Second concentration-bug window
Overlaps with the bonding-curve-balance leak (§2.1) and a burst of
clone-launch creator activity in the same window.
### 5.4 Jun 24-25: Platform-wide silence-rate drop
The share of tokens with zero post-launch trading activity dropped from
~96.4% to ~88.9%. Checked and ruled out as a polling-cadence artifact
(sampling interval unchanged across the boundary) — most likely reflects
genuinely rising launch volume on the platform.
### 5.5 Jul 3-4: Websocket outage + `curve_pct_depleted` shift
See §3.4 for full detail. Jul 3 is a confirmed collection outage (zero
trades that day). The subsequent shift in `curve_pct_depleted` badness
rate (flat <2% before, 8-11% after, sustained through corpus end) is
temporally associated with this outage but not fully root-caused beyond
that.
---
## 6. Schema & naming gotchas
- **`outcome_label = 'dead'`** (a token that graduated, then died within
24h) is a **completely different population** from a token that never
graduated at all. Same word, two unrelated meanings across different
parts of this corpus — do not conflate them.
- **`postgard_outcomes.parquet`'s real exported schema does not match**
older collector source-code comments. Fields like `label_time_top10_pct`
/ `label_time_gini` are defined in source-level DDL but do **not** exist
in the actual exported file. Always verify against a live `DESCRIBE`,
never trust schema from code comments or documentation.
- **`postgard_snapshots.parquet` covers more distinct mints (5,701) than
a typical filtered target population** (e.g. graduated, non-mayhem
tokens is a smaller subset) — filter explicitly by your actual target
population; don't assume table membership implies population membership.
- **`v_tokens_bonding_curve` / `v_sol_bonding_curve`** (in `trades.parquet`)
are raw micro-token units, not human-scale token counts. A naive `/1e9`
conversion produces values off by orders of magnitude (though
correlations computed on the wrongly-scaled values remain valid, since
it's a consistent scaling error). The correct relationship is
`price_sol = (v_sol_bonding_curve / v_tokens_bonding_curve) / 1000`.
---
## 7. Modeling gotchas (not data bugs, but easy to leak on)
- **`entry_price_20s_usd` / `entry_price_30s_usd` / `entry_price_1m_usd`**
are a near-perfect label proxy if used naively as predictive features.
Null rate is ~0.14-0.18% for graduated tokens vs. ~93.5-93.6% for
non-graduated tokens, with **no time-to-graduation gradient** — these
fields are populated almost exclusively *because* a token graduated, not
because of when. Suppressing the missingness indicator column is **not**
sufficient to prevent leakage — tree-based models (XGBoost, LightGBM)
learn native NaN split directions and will still effectively split on
"is this field present." If building any graduation-prediction model on
this corpus, exclude these three fields entirely rather than
indicator-suppress them.
- **`first_trade_price_sol`** was checked with the same methodology and is
**fine** — its null gap is small and roughly even across outcomes
(27.9% graduated vs. 25.5% non-graduated), not the same near-total
separator as the fields above.
---
## 8. What's confirmed clean (checked, not just assumed)
- **`market_cap_sol` / `price_sol`** in `trades.parquet` are correctly
supply-invariant (derived from raw bonding-curve reserve ratios, not a
percentage-of-total-supply calculation) — confirmed clean of both the
mayhem-mode bug (§1.1) and the bonding-curve-balance leak (§2.1). Don't
assume every supply-related field is contaminated just because nearby
fields are — each was checked individually against its actual formula.
---
## 9. Tooling note (DuckDB users)
If querying this corpus with DuckDB, `USING SAMPLE N` (reservoir method)
has been observed to silently return 0 rows on filtered queries in some
environments, even though the identical query without the sample clause
returns thousands of rows — not root-caused against DuckDB internals, but
reproducible via direct A/B testing. `USING SAMPLE N` (bernoulli method)
throws an outright parser error when combined with a discrete row-count
target. Workaround that was verified to work correctly, including with
joins, at matching scale: use `setseed()` + `ORDER BY random()` + `LIMIT`
instead of `USING SAMPLE` entirely.